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RESPONSE TO RODES AND SHAFFER'S "A
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY FOR ROMAN
CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS"
Susan Brenner*
Good evening. My name is Susan Brenner, and I am a new member of the law faculty, which means that I did not know Father Vasey.
I would like to begin by saying that I am very honored to have been
asked to respond to the comments offered by Professor Rodes and Professor Shaffer, and to add my comments to those which have been offered-by Professor Saphire and will be offered by Father Heft.
In doing so, I am at something of a disadvantage: I know very
little about Catholic theology, and law teaching is a relatively new enterprise for me. But I would like to comment on one issue that was
raised in the presentation.
That issue is false consciousness: Professor Rodes suggests that
one remedy for false consciousness is "the preferential option for the
poor," an option which he very ably described.
Professor Shaffer discussed the evolution of Catholic legal education in this country, and suggested it began with an uncritical acceptance of "the law." He attributed this acceptance to the predominance
of immigrants or the immediate descendants of immigrants in the
Catholic population at that time.
For these immigrants and near-immigrants, "the law" was a
quintessentially American construct. To learn "the law" was to become
American. To question the law was to be un-American. Therefore, one
"learned the law" uncritically; and, if "learning the law" meant unlearning beliefs which one had learned in one's home, or in one's
church, then this was a necessary price to pay for the process of "becoming American."
What I believe Professors Shaffer and Rodes are suggesting is that
Catholic law schools have outgrown this model, and have reached the
point at which they can embark on a challenging endeavor: That endeavor is the task of making the law itself problematical.
What does it mean to make the law problematical? And is it
something that we routinely do under the prevailing model of legal
education?
We do teach our students to take specific laws as problematical. I
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teach a course in federal criminal law, for example, and in that course
we look at particular federal criminal laws. I ask the students to consider each such law as problematical, by which I mean that they must
critically analyze the inception, purposes and application of that law.
And I know that my colleagues do the same thing in other areas of the
law.
We also teach our students to take specific case law as problematical: In teaching our courses, we all require that the students analyze
particularcases in terms of why that particular court reached that particular decision. And we all require that our students consider whether
or not that particular case law is a "good" decision in terms of certain
types of criteria, which is an issue I shall return to in a minute.
My point is that we do ask our students to take particular laws as
problematical. And we also ask our students to take the application of
particular laws as problematical.
But what we do not ask our students to do, at least, not in my
experience, is to take ".the law," the social fact of "the laws," as
problematical.
What do I mean when I refer to the process of taking "the law" as
problematical? In order to explain what I mean, I have to say a few
words about "the law."
Why do we go to law school? To learn "the law." What do we
learn when we learn the "the law"? We learn some substance-a little
torts, some contracts, a little criminal law, some tax, and so on. We
also learn some process-a way of thinking about the substance we
have learned and a way of applying it to new situations that arise.
Who do we learn this from? Who did we learn this from? We
learned this from another generation of law teachers, who learned it
from an earlier generation of law teachers who may very well have
learned it from a generation of practitioners turned law teachers. And
this generation learned it from an earlier generation of practitioners,
and so on.
So what we have here is a body of knowledge that has been
handed down from one generation of law teachers to another for centuries. And how did this body of law develop?
It developed in response to cases that arose between people that
were presented to lawyers. And because it developed in response to
cases that arose between people, it developed rules that prescribed how
people should behave in regard to each other. Some of these rules
evolved into the law of torts, some evolved into the law of crimes, some
into the law of contracts, and so on.
The rules that evolved were not created in a vacuum. They evolved
in a social context, and that social context influenced the particular
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/6

1988]

BRENNER'S RESPONSE

rules that developed. It is difficult, for example, to imagine the American Indians as ever having developed a concept such as the law of trespass onto land, since they did not have a concept of land ownership. If
land cannot be owned, then it cannot be "trespassed upon," and no law
can develop in this area.
If we do not take the law as problematical, then we do not realize,
or we tend to forget, that it evolved against the background of a particular social context, and was articulated to meet particular social needs.
We tend to assume, for example, that the law of trespass is a "given,"
that it is an inevitable fixture of "the law."
If we do not realize that "the law" evolved against a particular
background, and was articulated to meet particular social needs, then
we tend to operate as if the law were real, were something more than a
collection of routine practices and understandings, generated in a particular social context.
And if we begin to operate on the assumption that the law is real,
in an external, exterior sense, then we tend to forget that it is something we created. And if we forget that it is something we created, we
also forget that it is something we can (and perhaps should) change.
In the sociology of knowledge, there is a concept known as the
taken for granted reality of everyday life. This concept refers to the
ideas, beliefs and implicit assumptions that guide us through our everyday life. For lawyers, "the law" is an essential element for their taken
for granted reality of everyday life. For economists, economics is an
essential element of their taken for granted reality of everyday life.
It is in this sense that law becomes false consciousness: Professor
Rodes described an economics student who relied upon economics to
justify the proposition that "some have and some have not." Her reliance upon economics in this instance was an exercise in false consciousness because she did not question her taken for granted reality-her
adherence to the economics principles taught to her in class.
The central characteristic of false consciousness is that it is obeyed
without question: Those who are enmeshed in a system of false consciousness, like the economics student, do not question the ideas, beliefs
and implicit assumptions which constitute that false consciousness. Because they do not, indeed, cannot, question these ideas, beliefs, and implicit assumptions, their false consciousness dictates their behavior.
Those who study the sociology of knowledge will tell you that false
consciousness can be overcome by making the elements of a particular
false consciousness problematical. In the story about Rush Street, for
example, if the economics student had questioned the information she
had learned in her economics class, she might not have concluded that
''some have and some have not."
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It is not particularly difficult to suggest that one should scrutinize
one's taken for granted reality. It is not particularly difficult to suggest
that lawyers should take "the law" as problematical in order to avoid,
eliminate or at least alleviate the problems of "false consciousness."
It is particularly difficult to put this into practice. When I was in
graduate school, trying to become a sociologist of knowledge, we devoted a great deal of time and effort to the philosophical and sociological techniques that one can utilize in scrutinizing one's taken for
granted reality. The purpose, of course, was to test the validity of the
assumptions which constitute this reality in an atmosphere in which
they were no longer "taken for granted." The process, therefore, was to
make one's professional and personal beliefs "problematical."
It seems to me that this is what the preferential option for the
poor accomplishes: If the economics student had applied this option to
her experience on Rush Street, for example, she would have been able
to take the knowledge which she had learned in her economics classes
as problematical. If she had taken her economics knowledge as problematical, she would not have been required to reach the conclusion
that it was unnecessary and improper to redistribute wealth to the poor
boys on Rush Street because "some have and some have not."
This is not to say that she might not have reached that conclusion.
This is to say that if she did reach the same conclusion, i.e., that distributing money to the boys was incorrect because "some have and
some have not," she would have done so by some means other than
false consciousness.
I think what our distinguished visitors are saying is that the preferential option of the poor is a device which law faculty can utilize in
an attempt to teach their students to identify false consciousness in
"the law."
How might this work? How could the preferential option for the
poor contribute to making the law problematical?
I teach criminal law, so I shall use that as my example: According
to Professor Rodes, the preferential option for the poor "calls us to
examine carefully all institutions and take such control of them as is
required to see that they serve the whole society."
We begin, therefore, with the criminal law as a social institution:
What purpose does the criminal law serve? Does it, in fact, serve any
purpose for the poor boys on Rush Street? Or does it serve only the
patrons of the bars on Rush Street?
If one does not take "the criminal law" as problematical, then the
response will be superficial, on the order of "criminal law puts the bad
guys in jail" or, "criminal law keeps order." Such responses are the
product of false consciousness.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/6
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The false consciousness that produces these responses can be the
product of various factors, including education in the home, education
prior to attending law school or even education in law school.
I agree with Professors Shaffer and Rodes that one of the goals of
legal education should be to overcome false consciousness. It seems to
me that false consciousness is the antithesis of the analytical thinking
and sense of social responsibility which we attempt to inculcate in our
students.
And for that reason, I agree that one of the tasks of legal education is to make the law problematical. If we can make the criminal
law problematical,then we can generate something more than superficial answers to the questions I posed earlier, about the function of the
criminal law.
I would also agree that the preferential option of the poor is a
strategy that can be used to make the law problematical in one particular respect-in regard to its obligations to those who may have very
little ability to influence the specific precepts of "the law." And I believe that this is an endeavor which should be pursued.
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